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Abstract
It is natural to suppose that a prosecutor’s conviction rate– the ratio of convictions to
cases prosecuted– is a sign of his competence. Prosecutors, however, choose which cases
to prosecute. If they prosecute only the strongest cases, they will have high conviction
rates. Any system which pays attention to conviction rates, as opposed to the number of
convictions, is liable to abuse. As a prosecutor’s budget increases, he allocates it between
prosecuting more cases and putting more eﬀort into existing cases. Either can be socially
desirable, depending on particular circumstances. We model the tradeoﬀs theoretically
in two models, one of a benevolent social planner and one of a prosecutor who values
not just the number of convictions but the conviction rate and unrelated personal goals.
We apply the model to U.S. data drawn from county-level crime statistics and a survey
of all state prosecutors by district. Conviction rates do have a small negative correlation
with prosecutorial budgets, but conditioning on other variables in regression analysis,
higher budgets are associated both with more prosecutions and higher conviction rates.
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11 Introduction
Attorney Thomas Broderick Jr. will formally announce Tuesday that he is a candidate
for the Democratic nomination for Madison County prosecutor. He was chief deputy for
Prosecutor William F. Lawler Jr. for more than seven years, claiming a 98 percent personal
conviction rate on cases ranging from drugs to murder.1
So reads a typical press release in an election for county prosecutor. The prosecutor’s role is one
of the most important in criminal justice, yet one of the most neglected by scholarship. Standing
between the criminal and the police on the one hand and the courts and prisons on the other, the
prosecutor has two jobs. One, as candidate Broderick stresses, is to convince the court to convict.
The other is to decide whom to prosecute.
Other things equal, it is good to have a prosecutor who wins cases. But other things are not
equal. A prosecutor might choose to prosecute innocent enemies. He might choose to prosecute
very few cases. Were he to spend an entire year prosecuting one case, he could easily obtain not a
98 percent conviction rate, but 100 percent. A high win rate might actually tell us the prosecutor
is slack, not tough. As a former Securities and Exchange Commission examiner said after the SEC
failed to respond to explicit warnings about the Madoﬀ Ponzi scheme:
During my time at the SEC, I heard the excuses about why cases that we, the examination
staﬀ, uncovered failed to warrant actions by the enforcement staﬀ. Too small – best wishes to
the small investors involved. Too complicated – derivatives would fall under this category. Too
politically connected – don’t want to rock the boat. In many ways, the Madoﬀ fraud shares
the same excuses for not being uncovered as the unmitigated disasters that were Fannie Mae
and Freddie Mac, AIG and the subprime mortgage lenders.
Part of the problem is that enforcement likes to bat 1.000, because of the way the system
works, meaning they like to bring only cases they will win. I recall that anything less than
that resulted in warning letters or no actions whatsoever.2
In this article, we focus on the problem of case selection: whether to allocate resources broadly
over many cases or intensively to a few cases. Consider the contrast between the United States and
Japan. Conviction rates are high in both countries, but higher in Japan. American state prosecutors
win 85 percent of their felony cases and 90 percent of their misdemeanors. Federal prosecutors win
90 percent. Yet Japanese prosecutors win 99.9 percent.3 This is not due to any biased judicial
incentives: judges do not suﬀer a career hit for acquitting defendants (Ramseyer and Rasmusen,
2001).
1Attorney Says He’ll Be Candidate for Prosecutor, Indianapolis Star, January 17, 1998, at N02.
2Eric W. Bright, “It Isn’t Surprising That SEC Missed Madoﬀ’s Scam,” letter to the editor, The Wall Street
Journal, 22 December 2008, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123000061773329323.html.
3The conviction rates of U.S. state prosecutors are obtained from the Census of Prosecutors, 2001, and for federal
prosecutors from http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/press/fcjt03pr.htm. For Japanese sources, see Ramseyer
and Rasmusen (2003), chapter 6.
1The contrast between U.S. and Japan holds true even among contested cases. Although
Japanese law does not allow plea bargains, defendants can confess, and those who do receive lighter
sentences. Among Japanese defendants who did contest their guilt in 2004, 98.4 percent were con-
victed. Among U.S. federal defendants who contested their guilt in 2003, only 83 percent were
convicted. 4 Japanese courts really do seem tougher.
Might not case selection explain the diﬀerence better than toughness? Suppose Japanese
prosecutors drop all but their strongest cases. After all, their resources are stretched thin. Japan
employs about 1,200 prosecutors. With twice the population, the U.S. employs 32,000. Japan has
less crime, but that hardly explains the diﬀerence. Each year, police in the U.S. make about 14
million non- traﬃc arrests – 438 crimes per prosecutor. Japanese police clear about 1.4 million
Criminal Code violations per year – 1,166 crimes per prosecutor. The number of crimes is low in
Japan, but the number of prosecutors is even lower.
Diﬀerences in prosecution rates (prosecutions/crimes) reﬂect this diﬀerence in workload. In
1994, U.S. state courts convicted 870,000 people of felonies, and the federal courts another 44,000.
Combining the conviction rates cited earlier and the FBI’s index crime arrests ﬁgure yields a 42
percent prosecution/arrest ratio. In Japan, by contrast, prosecutors only prosecuted only 14 per-
cent of the 1.4 million people arrested for Criminal Code violations in 2002. The comparison is
crude – the crime data is not strictly comparable. But it does suggest that Japanese prosecutors
allocate their scarce time to the cases with the strongest evidence.5 The lower budget in Japan
leads to a lower prosecution rate. Might the lower budget in Japan be raising the conviction rate
(convictions/prosecutions)?
In civil cases, Priest and Klein (1984) famously explained how the selection dynamic aﬀected
verdict rates. We may observe plaintiﬀs winning 90% of the cases, they noted, but that does not tell
us about the strength of the plaintiﬀs’ cases generally. Instead, it tells us only about their strength
in the subset of cases in which the plaintiﬀs could not agree with the defendant about what would
happen at trial. Quite possibly (but not necessarily), the plaintiﬀs would have lost most of their
claims – but because they knew they would lose they settled out-of-court for small sums.
The same dynamic applies to criminal cases. Conviction rates at trial (convictions/prosecutions)
do not tell us about the strength of the prosecutors’ cases generally. Instead, the rates tell us only
about the strength of those few cases the prosecutor chooses to pursue and the defendant chooses
to contest. In the U.S., only 4% of the defendants go to trial. In the data discussed above, 61%
of the actual trials were bench trials and 39% jury trials. 85% ended in guilty verdicts and 15% in
acquittal.6 A better measure than conviction rates at trial of a prosecutor’s eﬀectivness is his ability
4Table 12 of http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/fcjt03.pdf
5For a dissenting view, see Saxonhouse (2001). For more on the prosecutorial system in Japan, see the book by
Johnson (2001).
6This implies the percentage of hung juries was close to zero, which is surprising. A diﬀerent study of state
and federal courts found that 6.2% of juries were hung. Nicole L. Mott, “Part II: The Role of Juries in State
Courts,” p. 101, Brian Ostrom, Neal B. Kauder, and Robert C. LaFountain, “Examining the Work of State Courts,
2to handle plea bargains (which after all, have a greater bearing on the aggregate punishments he is
able to obtain): how many defendants plead guilty, and what sentences do they receive?
Rather than examine trial conviction rates, in the article below we look at conviction rates
for all cases pursued, whether through plea bargaining or through trial. This has more meaning
than trial wins alone, because if a prosecutor does not even pursue a case he has failed to punish
the criminal. A high conviction rate might still indicate lenient plea bargains, but he has at least
done better than if he had dropped the case. We will also look at a prosecutor’s choice of cases to
prosecute. In Japan, prosecutors apparently prosecute only the easiest cases, and we ask whether
the same a pattern exists in the U.S.
We begin with two models of prosecutorial behavior: (a) a prosecutor who, as social planner,
maximizes criminal sentences, and (b) a prosecutor who balances that goal against a high conviction
rate and other personal objectives. We then use data on the level of counties and state prosecu-
tor districts to explore the relationship between prosecution rates, conviction rates, and budgets.
Ultimately, we show that elected prosecutors may respond to electoral pressure by using resources
to raise their conviction rates beyond the levels a social planner would choose, and thereby (by
reducing the number of cases pursued) to lower the total punishment imposed.
2 The Literature on Prosecutors
A complaint at least as old as Forst & Brosi (1977) is that prosecutors have been insuﬃciently
studied, either with theory or empirics. That article did build a theoretical model of the prosecutor
as attempting to achieve penalties based on the seriousness of the crime and the past record of the
criminal given limited resources and the possibility of plea bargaining. Their article built on the
simpler model of Landes (1971) and tested the theory with regressions on data at the level of the
individual. Other studies have also looked at the variables determining which cases are prosecuted.
Myers & Hagan (1979) and Albonetti, (1986) run regressions on individual case data, and Rainville
(2001) uses a survey of 77 prosecutors that asked them about their policies of when to prosecute
and when to drop. Boylan (2004) looks at the internal workings of federal prosecutor oﬃces and
ﬁnds that more experienced U.S. Attorneys put priority on crimes that have longer prison sentences.
Glaeser, Kessler & Piehl (2000) look at how cases are handled depending on whether the defendant
is represented by private counsel instead of a public defender. They ﬁnd that in districts with high
lawyers’ salaries, defendants represented by private counsel are more likely to be prosecuted by
assistant U.S. attorneys than by state and local prosecutors.
The closest paper to the present one is Rhodes (1976). Rhodes looks at how the prosecutor
uses increased budget to bring more prosecutions and reduce the leniency of his plea bargains.
2001”(Williamsburg, VA: National Center for State Courts, 2002) http://www.ncsconline.org/D_Research/csp/
2001_Files/2001_Part_II_Section.pdf.
3He uses data from 84 federal district courts to run regressions of case dispositions on prosecutor
resources and variables such as the fraction of defendants with criminal records in the district. He
acknowledges the endogeneity problem for the budget, but does not attempt to instrument for it.
Boylan (2005) has examined the incentives of federal prosecutors by seeing what aﬀects the
likelihood that U.S. Attorneys (the chief attorneys in federal prosecution oﬃces) later become
federal judges, a common career goal for them. He ﬁnds that a prosecutor’s conviction rate and
number of indictments do not aﬀect prosecutor’s success, but the number of prison months achieved
does matter. As we will see, the results of Boylan (2005) tend to support our model below of the
prosecutor acting purely in the public interest, in his special context of U.S. federal prosecutors.
Federal prosecutors are appointed, not elected, and the crimes they prosecute are diﬀerent from those
in the state courts, so in the empirical work below we should not be surprised if state prosecutors
are diﬀerently rewarded.
Miceli (1996) makes the important point that prosecutors (like judges) might well care about
fair sentences but not about deterrence, in contrast to legislatures. Thus, prosecutors might frustrate
Becker-style high penalties, infrequently imposed and cheap to administer, because those penalties
seem unfair for the individual criminals who do get caught. Snyder (1990) looks empirically at
one example where prosecutors and courts might be expected to diﬀer from the legislature: their
response to an increase by Congress in penalties for federal antitrust laws.
Other work exists on optimal prosecution, but that is a rather diﬀerent topic than prosecutors
themselves. Miceli (1990), for example, looks at how prosecutors and judges (together) should
behave when the guilt of defendants is uncertain. That is an important topic, but it is a diﬀerent
one from the decision of how to allocate resources or operate under institutional constraints. Much
economic analysis has also been done concerning plea bargaining (e.g. Adelstein (1978a, 1978b),
Reinganum (1988, 1993), and Baker and Mezzetti (2001)), but less on the career incentives of
prosecutors as agents of the public. One exception is Huber and Gordon (2002), which formally
models the incentives of elected prosecutors. They focus on what performance measure voters
should reward in order to induce the prosecutor to investigate the guilt or innocence of defendants
rather than bring to court cases he knows are dubious. In the present model, our focus will be
quite diﬀerent: it will be on the prosecutor’s decision, forced by limitations of time and resources,
to drop some cases, prosecute others, and to prosecute some more intensely than others.
3. A Model with the Social Planner as Prosecutor
In this section, we construct a model of prosecutorial decisionmaking, in which there are no
agency problems: the prosecutor is the social planner.7 There is a continuum of potential cases that
could be prosecuted, all involving the same crime.8 Thus, each case has little importance compared
7The starting point for this model is the graphical argument in Appendix A, Chapter 6 of Ramseyer and Rasmusen
(2001). This model formalizes that argument and extends it to consideration of agency slack, length of sentence, and
the conviction rate.
8The assumption of a single type of crime is innocuous. If there were n types of crime, with diﬀerent values
4to the aggregate. Potential cases will be indexed by “strength,” θ, where θ varies from 0 to 1. The
number of cases of type θ is represented by a density function f(θ), where
R ∞
0 f(θ)dθ = 1, which is
to say that we will normalize so the universe of possible cases has size 1. Figure 1 shows one way
the cases might be distributed. If the prosecutor decides to prosecute the strongest 1/3 of cases,
he takes all the cases in the interval [θ,1] in the diagram.9 We will assume that the prosecutor has
no evidence of innocence that he can conceal from the court, so a case being “strong” also means
that the defendant is more likely guilty, and that the resources available to the prosecutor are low
enough that he is far from being able to prosecute cases too weak to be worth prosecuting from a
social point of view. (Put diﬀerently, we will assume that social welfare is maximized by spending



















for conviction, we would simply repeat the same objective n times with diﬀerent production functions and a value
coeﬃcient for each, e.g, a tough conviction function but a value of 10 for convicting a murderer, an easy conviction
function but a value of 2 for convicting a thief.
9We will assume that the interval [0,1] only includes cases the prosecutor would like to win. Thus, a case having
θ = .1 does not mean the defendant was less likely to have committed the crime, only that the prosecutor’s evidence
is weak. As with adding diﬀerent types of crimes, adding concerns about whether convictions for some crimes are
really in the public interest would not alter the model’s implications.
5Figure 1: The Distribution of Cases
Each case that is prosecuted incurs a ﬁxed cost of C and a variable cost of e. Let the probability
of winning a case be
Probability of winning = θP(e(θ)) (1)
where P(0) = 0, P 0 > 0, P 00 < 0, and P(∞) < 1, so additional eﬀort always helps but there are
decreasing returns to eﬀort in a particular case and the prosecutor can never be sure of winning.















Figure 2: The Conviction Function
These assumptions say that the probability of winning is scaled up or down by case strength,
θ, as shown in Figure 2. If eﬀort is the same for two types of case, the type with the bigger θ has
6the greater probability of winning.10
Let the social planner’s ideal sentence be V , and the expected penalty for a case of strength θ
be
Expected Penalty = θV (e(θ)) (2)
where V (0) = 0, V 0 > 0, V 00 < 0, and V (∞) < V , so additional eﬀort always helps, but there are
decreasing returns to eﬀort in a particular case and no amount of eﬀort can achieve the optimal
penalty.11
We have assumed that the social planner’s ideal sentence is V . Let us denote his valuation of
an expected sentence of θS by θU(S) with U0 > 0 and U00 < 0 in the range [0,V ], so the penalty
has diminishing marginal returns. We can then write θV (e(θ))) = θU(S(e(θ))) for the expected
value to the social planner of exerting eﬀort e on case θ, where V (0), V 0 > 0 V ” < 0, since V is an
increasing concave function of another increasing concave function.
Effort, e
0





Figure 3: The Prosecutor’s Choices of e(θ) and θ
10The speciﬁcation also implies that if eﬀort is the same for two types of cases, the marginal product of eﬀort is
bigger for the case with the bigger θ, as illustrated by the tangents in Figure 2. That eﬀect is not important to our
results.
11We are ruling out the possibility that the social planner would exert high eﬀort so as to fool the court into
imposing a sentence higher than V with some probability, thus putting the expected sentence at V .
7We now come to our social planner prosecutor’s problem. He has two choices. First, he must
decide which cases to prosecute. He will want to prosecute the easier cases ﬁrst, which amounts
to choosing a lower cutoﬀ θ for the interval of types [θ,1] that he prosecutes. The spending on
this weakest case prosecuted is the extensive margin, analogous to the least fertile land that under
cultivation. Second, he needs to pick the e(θ) function, which shows how much he spends on each
type θ of case. this is the intensive margin, analogous to the marginal unit of fertilizer used on





f(θ)dθ = 1 − F(θ). (3)















The prosecution rate sums up the amount of case density, g, above the prosecution threshold,
θ. In Figure 1, (1 − F(θ)) = 1/3.
The number of convictions sums up over all the prosecuted cases (those on interval [θ,1]) the
density f of the number of cases of each type, times the probability of conviction for that type, θP.
The value of convictions sums up over all the prosecuted cases (those on interval [θ,1]) the
density f(θ) of the number of cases of each type, times the value of convictions for that type, θV .
The conviction rate is the average probability that a prosecution results in a conviction (which
will be larger than the probability that a crime results in a conviction). It divides the probability
of convictions from equation (4) by the number of cases prosecuted, from equation (3).
What is the prosecutor’s payoﬀ function? Let us start with the social planner as prosecutor.




by choice of e(θ) and θ, subject to the budget constraint,
Z 1
θ
f(θ)[e(θ) + C]dθ ≤ B. (8)



















which is to say that λ equals the marginal value of relaxing the budget constraint.
There are two optimality conditions if we are at an interior solution (that is, if not all or no
cases are prosecuted). First, there is the choice of the e(θ) function. For each value θ in the interval




0(e(θ)) − λf(θ)(1) = 0. (11)
Rearranging, we see that the marginal payoﬀ of eﬀort has to be the same for each case prose-
cuted. For any θ,
θV
0(e(θ)) = λ. (12)
The second optimality condition concerns the choice of θ. It says that
dL
dθ





The amount (e(θ) + F) is the total cost of a case of the marginal strength θ, and θV (e(θ)) is
the total beneﬁt. Thus, we have that λ equals the average cost of the marginal case. Moreover,
since we found earlier that the marginal beneﬁts of all cases prosecuted are equal and equal to λ,
we can conclude that the marginal beneﬁt of any case prosecuted equals the average beneﬁt of the
marginal case.
This implies that at the margin, the prosecutor would get the same beneﬁt from adding a new
case as he would from increasing spending on an existing case. It also implies that as his budget
increases (which reduces λ) he will prosecute more cases as well as spending more on existing cases.
9The result will be to increase the expected penalty from both the new cases brought and the increase
in success of the old cases. Formally:
Proposition 1: In the Social Planner Model, an increase in the budget, B, increases eﬀort on
existing cases (e(θ) for θ > θ), increases the prosecution rate (reduces θ), and increases the size of
the expected penalty.

























we can conclude that
de(θ)




Second, dividing ﬁrst-order condition (13) by f(θ), we know it is true that we can deﬁne a
variable Z such that
Z = −θV (e(θ)) + λ[e(θ) + F] = 0 (18)
Diﬀerentiating expression (18) and substituting from equation (12) for θV 0(e(θ)) yields
dZ




= −V (e(θ)) − λe
0(θ) + λe
0(θ)





















we can conclude that dθ
dλ > 0. Equation ( 10) and the concavity of L tell us that λ falls with B.
Thus, dθ
B < 0.
10Finally, the amount of expected penalty rises because it is an increasing function of e(θ) and
a decreasing function of θ). Q.E.D.
We cannot, however, say how an increase in the budget will aﬀect the conviction rate.
Proposition 2: In the Social Planner Model, an increase in the budget, B, might either increase
or reduce the conviction rate.







We have seen in Proposition 1 that when the budget increases, θ falls (reducing the conviction
rate) and e(θ) rises (increasing the conviction rate). Since these changes have opposite eﬀects
on expression (6), the outcome is ambiguous. From the proof of Proposition 1, the eﬀect of θ is
proportional to V
e(θ)+C for marginal changes. Thus, if the ﬁxed cost C is large enough, the change in
θ will have little impact, and the conviction rate will rise. The proof of Proposition 1 also tells us
that the eﬀect of changes in e(θ) is proportional to 1
θV 00(e(θ)). Thus, if V 00(e(θ)) is large enough for all
e(θ), the change in e(θ) will have little impact, and the conviction rate will fall. Thus, depending
on C and V 00 the conviction rate might increase or might fall after a budget increase. Q.E.D.
Proposition 2 says that the conviction rate can fall because two things matter as the budget
B increases. First, how big is the ﬁxed cost of prosecuting a case, C? If it is big, then most of the
extra budget will go to existing cases, and the conviction rate will rise, not fall. Second, how big is
θV 00(e(θ), the change in the marginal product of spending on existing cases? If it is very negative,
then there are sharply diminishing returns to increased spending on existing cases. As a result,
the average probability of success should fall when the budget rises, because the extra money goes
mostly to prosecute new, weaker, cases.
An increase in the ﬁxed cost C is similarly ambiguous. It will certainly increase θ, reducing
the prosecution rate (which is easily proved using the method of Proposition 1 and the fact that
dZ
dC = λ > 0). It reduces the amount of variable eﬀort e that the prosecutor can expend for a
given number of prosecutions, so the eﬀect on his objective, total value of prosecutions, cannot but
be negative. The eﬀect of a higher ﬁxed cost on the conviction rate, however, is ambiguous. The
average product of the marginal case will fall, and the prosecutor will shift resources towards the
other cases. He has to spend more on the ﬁxed cost of those cases, so we cannot tell in the end,
however, whether spending on the marginal eﬀort e increases or falls. Normal intuition tells us that
the conviction rate should fall if costs rise, but if it is a ﬁxed cost, that might not be the case.
Instead, it could happen that the prosecution rate falls so much that enough resource are freed up
for the remaining cases that the conviction rate rises.
Particularly surprising is the possibility that having juries more hostile to police and prosecutors
11might raise the conviction rate. This can be interpreted as an increase in C if it means more must
be spent to attain even a base-level probability of success. The eﬀect of a district having more
skeptical juries might as a result be to make prosecutors more selective about which cases they
bring, to such an extent that they win a higher fraction of them. This is just one way in which
skeptical juries could enter the model, and the way they aﬀect variable costs, ﬁxed costs, and the
probability of success is crucial. If the eﬀect is to multiply the expected penalty θV (θ) by a constant
such as 0.8, for example, the conviction rate will fall without any eﬀect on the prosecution rate or
the allocation of eﬀort. But the possible perverse eﬀect of C on shows how diﬃcult it would be
to predict the eﬀect of variables such as political climate on conviction rates. We must resort to
empirical estimation unless we are willing to make assumptions about how the prosecution rate
aﬀects the conviction rate.
The Political Model: The Prosecutor as Agent of the Voters
When the prosecutor uses the social welfare function for his payoﬀ, we can at least
predict the eﬀect of a budget change on the prosecution rate, if not the conviction
rate. Once agency problems are introduced, even this becomes diﬃcult. Two central
problems in any principal-agent relationship are that (a) the agent will want to use
his eﬀort for personal goals unrelated to the principal’s goal, and (b) if the principal
rewards the agent based on a rough proxy for the principal’s true objective, the agent
will pursue the proxy and not the real thing. The more the principal tries to solve
problem (a) with a high-powered incentive contract, the more he must worry about
problem (b). Here, the principal is the public and the agent is the prosecutor. Problem
(a) takes the form of the prosecutor wanting to use his oﬃce’s resources for things such
as perks for himself, higher wages for his subordinates, and prosecutions or other use
of oﬃce personnel that are intended to further his post-prosecutorial career in the
public or private sector. Problem (b) takes the form of the prosecutor focusing too
much on variables the principal can measure well and too little on other goals.
Here, we will focus on the conviction rate as that well-measured variable, some-
thing some voters will reward despite its imperfections as a measure of performance.
Prosecutor agents must please their principals, however, whether they are appointed
or elected, and they have personal objectives too. If the prosecutor must run for re-
election his payoﬀ function may also include the conviction rate, as suggested in the
Introduction. An elected prosecutors— and perhaps appointed an one too— must ap-
peal to people who do not know how many potential cases exist, and so have diﬃculty
evaluating the number of convictions he achieves, not to mention the average sentence
for those convictions. The absolute number of prosecutions is by itself meaningless to
a voter, and even the prosecution rate is not a helpful number given the small number
of arrests and prosecutions that occur anywhere in the United States relative to the
amount of crime. A conviction rate, however, conveys some meaning, and will have
even more impact on voters who have not thought of the eﬀect of careful selection of
12which cases to prosecute. It will not be the only variable that aﬀects voters– if the
prosecution rate falls enough, the change will be noticeable, and by continuity even a
small change will have some impact on voters; if a person had absolutely no perception
of a temperature decline of one degree, he could not perceive a decline of ﬁfty degrees
either. But voters, even more than administrative superiors, will look to clear mea-
sures such as conviction rates, as Gordon & Huber (2002) argue. We might expect that
if an elected prosecutor’s term of oﬃce is short or the degree of political competition
is high, the prosecutor would put more weight on acquiring a high conviction rate.
Conviction rates should thus be correlated with short terms or frequent turnover in
the oﬃce, something we will look at below.
We will put these two agency problems together into what we will call the Political
Model. If we denote eﬀort spent on personal goals as ea and the utility of personal
goals and slack as S(ea) with S0 > 0 and S00 < 0 (so increased eﬀort devoted to slack has
diminishing marginal utility), we can write the payoﬀ function as
Payoﬀ(prosecutor) = U[α(conviction rate),(1 − α)β(personal goals),
(1 − α)(1 − β)(convictions)]













In the Political Model payoﬀ function, α parameterizes the importance of a high
conviction rate to the prosecutor and β parameterizes the importance of low eﬀort
spent on prosecutions, where if α = β = 0 we return to the original model of the social
planner. These parameters have been introduced in a particular way. The parameter
α represents political pressure by voters who vote on the basis of the conviction rate.
To the extent that the prosecutor does not care about them, (1−α), his payoﬀ is split
between slack eﬀort and the number of convictions. Thus, a way to represent loose
political pressure is a low value of α, and a way to represent a prosecutor who will
follow the public interest if he is not under political pressure is with a low value of β.





f(θ)[e(θ) + C]dθ ≤ B. (25)
13The Lagrangian for the maximization problem is
Maximize
ea,e(θ),θ L = U[αW[e(θ),θ],(1 − α)βS(ea),(1 − α)(1 − β)C[e(θ),θ]]
+λ
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= U2(1 − α)βS
0 − λ = 0. (27)
The ﬁrst optimality condition says that the prosecutor’s gain from extra slack must
equal its cost in terms of foregone budget that might have been spent on a higher
conviction rate or more convictions.









0 + U3(1 − α)(1 − β)f(θ)θV
0 − λf(θ)(1) = 0. (28)
Rearranging and combining these last two conditions, we see that the marginal
payoﬀ of eﬀort must be the same for each case prosecuted, as in the social planner








0 + U3(1 − α)(1 − β)θV
0 = λ. (29)
As α rises, the prosecutor slackens less and puts more eﬀort into each case he
chooses to prosecute, for a higher conviction rate. Unlike earlier, however, it is the
probability of conviction in a case, P, rather than the expected penalty, V , which
matters, so we would expect the number of generous plea bargains to increase. As
β rises, more eﬀort is diverted to personal goals, leaving less for prosecutions. As λ
rises, indicating a greater marginal utility of money and a lower budget, eﬀort per
prosecution and slack both fall.


















−U3(1 − α)(1 − β)f(θ)θV (e(θ)) + λf(θ)[e(θ) + C]
= 0.
(30)
14Again the the average payoﬀ of expenditure on the marginal case prosecuted equals
λ, the marginal payoﬀ on any case. At the margin, the prosecutor should get the same
beneﬁt from adding a new case as he would from increasing spending on an existing
case.
Introducing the conviction rate into the payoﬀ function and allowing the payoﬀ
function to have three arguments instead of one means the objective function is no
longer concave in the prosecution threshold θ. Indeed, we can say very little now about
comparative statics, which is the point of Proposition 3.
Proposition 3: In the Political Model, the conviction rate and prosecution rate might either rise
or fall with the budget.
Proof. The conviction rate depends on the number of cases prosecuted, θ . Proposition
2 showed that if more cases are prosecuted, the conviction rate can fall. Here, we have
changed the objective function by adding the conviction rate directly and by adding
slack. If the weight put on these two objectives is chosen to be small enough, then
Proposition 2’s conclusion will still apply, because the eﬀect of these two objective
variables on the optimal choice of control variables is continuous. Thus, the budget
has an ambiguous eﬀect on the conviction rate.
We similarly know from Proposition 1 that the prosecution rate might rise with
the budget. To prove that it can fall, consider the following example. Suppose that
at the level of the choice variables optimized for the initial budget the marginal payoﬀ
to the prosecutor of convictions, C is falling in the size of the conviction rate, W, so
U13 < 0 (e.g. because a higher conviction rate reduces the importance of a high number
of convictions to win re-election), and that convictions has greater diminishing payoﬀ
than the conviction rate (U11 is small relative to U33). An increase in the budget will
then be spent more on increasing the eﬀort on existing cases, increasing the conviction
rate, and reducing the value of convictions, so that the optimal θ would fall: fewer
prosecutions would result from a higher budget. Q.E.D.
Proposition 2 showed how the conviction rate might either rise or fall with in-
creased budget because the prosecutor might start taking on more diﬃcult cases.
What is diﬀerent in Proposition 3’s Political Model is that now the prosecutor has two
new objectives besides getting convictions: a high conviction rate, and low personal
eﬀort on prosecution. If we reduce the parameters that represent the importance of
these new goals to the prosecutor, we will be increasing the importance he puts on
convictions. The Social Planner Model is the limit of the Political Model as the impor-
tance of the two new goals goes to zero, so we should expect Proposition 2’s reasoning
for an ambiguous eﬀect of budget on conviction rate to also be possible in the Political
Model. We might expect somewhat greater conviction rates in the Political Model
because the prosecutor cares directly about the conviction rate, but we also might
15expect both fewer prosecutions and a lower conviction rate because of agency slack.
Proposition 3 also says that it is impossible to say generally how an increase in
the budget will aﬀect the prosecution rate. This is surprising, because Proposition 1
said that in the Social Planner Model we could conﬁdently predict that prosecutions
would rise with the budget. The reasoning there was that an increase in the budget
allowed improvements on two margins, the extensive margin of prosecuting more cases
and the intensive margin of prosecuting existing cases more heavily, and that with
diminishing returns to each margin some of the extra budget should be devoted to
each. The analogous reasoning here would be that although we now have three goals
(convictions, conviction rate, and slack) instead of just one (convictions), there are
diminishing returns to each and the extra budget should be spent on all three. But
that reasoning is fallacious.
The fallacy is that the three goals can interact with each other in complicated
ways, unlike the two means (marginal and extensive) to the one goal of maximizing
convictions. The prosecutor’s choice among goals is like that of a consumer among
goods. Just as a higher income can result in a consumer buying less margarine, an in-
ferior good, so a higher budget could result in a prosecutor “buying” fewer convictions.
Instead, he might spend all of the increase in his budget, and more, on increasing the
conviction rate and advancing his personal goals of slack and non-prosecution goals
that aid his re-election.
The theory just laid out tells us that from the normative point of view it is diﬃcult
to say whether a prosecutor’s conviction rate should be high (from Proposition 2), and
from the positive point of view it is hard to predict whether it will increase with the
budget (Propositions 2 and 3). If the Social Planner model is not just normative, but
also describes how prosecutors behave, then a budget increase will be spent partly on
the intensive margin of prosecuting the existing number of cases with extra resources
and partly on the extensive margin of prosecuting more cases. The number of prosecu-
tions and convictions will rise, but the conviction rate might fall. The Political Model
is a positive model which adds the conviction rate and slack to the prosecutor’s objec-
tive function. These new goals both conﬂict with spending on the extensive margin
of new prosecutions. As a result, not only does the eﬀect of increased budget on the
conviction rate remain ambiguous (Propositions 2 and 3), but we cannot even say that
the number of prosecutions or convictions will rise (Proposition 3). Thus, when we
look at anecdotal or numerical data, if the personal goals of prosecutors depend on the
conviction rate we should not be surprised if high budgets are not always associated
with high conviction rates.
Proposition 3 does say that in the Political Model the eﬀect of a budget increase is
ambiguous for both the conviction rate and the prosecution rate, unlike the eﬀect for
16the prosecution rate in the Social Planner Model stated in Proposition 1. Thus, we can
try to test between the two models based on whether prosecutions rise with budgets.
Whether the conviction rate rises with the budget is ambiguous in both models, but
we would expect the conviction rate to rise more (or fall less) in districts where the
Political Model is more likely to apply because prosecutors are elected rather than
appointed or where they are elected with shorter terms.
3 State Prosecutions in the United States
We can do simple tests for the Social Planner Model versus the Political Model using
state-level data from the United States. In 2001, 2,341 prosecutor’s oﬃces handled
felony cases in state courts of general jurisdiction. They employed some 79,000 people
and had a budget of about 4.7 billion dollars. The size of oﬃces increased markedly
over the previous decade. From 1994 to 2001, budgets grew 61% after inﬂation, and the
number of assistant prosecutors grew 26%. Of these oﬃces, 1,809 employed full-time
chief prosecutors and 532 had part-time chief prosecutors (in 29 states), an increase in
the number of full-time chief prosecutors to 77% compared to the 53% in 1990. Figure
4 is a map of the districts and also shows which had part-time prosecutors.12 3% of
the personnel were chief prosecutors, 30.5% were assistant prosecutors, and the rest
were people such as support staﬀ and investigators.
A full 87% of chief prosecutors were elected or appointed to four- year terms.
Chief prosecutors are elected everywhere except Alaska, Connecticut, the District of
Columbia, and New Jersey. In Alaska, Delaware, and Rhodes Island, criminal prose-
cution is the primary responsibility of the state’s attorney-general, and in the District
of Columbia the U.S. Attorney has jurisdiction over felonies and misdemeanors.
Half of the oﬃces received at least 85% of their funding from the county govern-
ment, and a third relied entirely on the county. Half received some state funding, and
6% had their entire funding from the state. City governments and grant funds also
supplied funding.
By deﬁnition, these oﬃces handle felonies. The percentages also handling mis-
demeanors, juvenile matters, and traﬃc violations were 91%, 89% and 84%. 51%,
handled felony appeals (including 77% of the 34 with district populations of over one
million), and 54% represented the government in civil suits.13
12Figure 4 and the numbers in this and the next three paragraphs are from DeFrances (2002).
13The distribution of these by size is interesting. The percentage of full-time prosecutors representing the gov-
ernment in civil suits was 41% in districts with over a million people, 27% in districts with between 250,000 and
17Figure 4: Prosecutorial Districts in the United States
4 Data and Endogeneity
If we are to study American prosecutors, our unit of observation should be the state
prosecutorial district. These are often the same as counties, but not always. Alaska,
for example, has just one prosecutorial district but many counties; and some counties
are split between prosecutorial districts.
Our task is see what explains conviction rates and prosecution rates in this data.
1,000,000 people, and 51% in districts with fewer than 250,000 people. The ﬁgure for part-time prosecutors, however,
was 75%.
18Our source for variables involving prosecutors’ oﬃces (e.g. conviction rates, salaries)
is the 2001 National Prosecutor’s Survey by the Bureau of Justice Statistics, U.S. De-
partment of Justice. This was a mail survey with telephone follow-up. 96% of the
2,341 oﬃces responded, and 98 did not. The Survey tried to ﬁnd data on the 98 miss-
ing oﬃces from secondary sources such as the county budget oﬃce. It also imputed
missing values for various variables using the “hot deck” method, which copies values
from observations having similar values for non-missing variables. These included 288
values for felony cases closed (DeFrances [2002]). The National Prosecutor’s Survey
occurs every few years, but in the 1992, 1994, 1996, and 1998 surveys it only included
a sample of about 300 districts, not the entire population of districts.
Our second major data source is the 2001 Uniform Crime Reporting Program
Data of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, U.S. Dept. of Justice. This is published
annually and contains detailed data on the amount of crime reported to police.
The crime data, which is arranged by county, is well known and much used; the
prosecutor dataset, arranged by prosecutorial district, is much less known. Our dataset
merges them, using the district as the unit of observation.
Another of our variables, a measure of political conservatism, the percentage of
the November 2000 presidential vote received by George Bush, is from the Center
for Presidential and Congressional Studies at American University. We also obtained
demographic information, from the Bureau of Census. This includes information about
population, racial composition of counties, per-capita income, median rent, population
density, housing density, educational attainment of population in diﬀerent counties,
the age composition of population in diﬀerent counties, and the total area of each
county. Each of these variables was at the county level, which we aggregate to the
level of prosecutorial districts that usually consist of several counties.
We conduct empirical investigation to see if the predictions from our theoretical
model match the results from the real world. To this end, we run regressions on the
conviction rate (felony convictions divided by the number of prosecutions times 100)
and the number of felony prosecutions. We use the number of prosecutions rather than
the rate because we do not have data for all reported felony crimes, just the number
of index crimes, whereas our prosecutions number is for all felonies. We run a tobit
regression to explain the conviction rate because it always lies between 0 and 100(%),
but least squares for the number of prosecutions.
The Census of Prosecutors data have some districts for which the conviction rate
is greater than 100% or less than 0%, which we dropped. This deletion is unlikely to
introduce bias into our estimates since those districts are spread all over the United
States and do not exhibit any peculiar pattern which sets them apart from the other
districts. We also dropped the top 5% of the districts by population. These districts
19are drastically diﬀerent in size from the rest, ranging in population from 537,000 to
9.51 million compared to a median of 34,000 for the other districts. We are left with
1,625 observations, of which about 1,400 contain values for all the variables we use in
the regressions.
Table 1 contains summary statistics for the regression variables. In addition, note
that 338 of the districts are in metropolitan areas and 14 of them have appointed
prosecutors.
Table 1: Summary Statistics
Percentile
Variable Mean Min 25th 50th 75th Max
Conviction Rate (%) 83 0 79 90 96 100
Number of Felony Cases Closed 599 1 75 218 573 15,639
Prosecutorial Budget ($1,000s) 777 6 125 298 750 15,500
Number of Index Crimes 457 0 26 131 461 8,856
Chief Prosecutor’s Salary ($1,000s) 77 11 52 80 99 150
Years in Oﬃce 9.14 0 4 7 14 40
Term of Oﬃce 4.11 1 4 4 4 10
Population 444 12,905 34,010 67,577.46 82,341 537,484
Presidential Vote for Bush in 2000 (%) 59 19 51 58 66 91
African-American Population 7,271 0 60 517 3,842 326,097
The prosecutorial budget and the number of index crimes might be endogenous,
inﬂuenced by the conviction and prosecution rates. We have accordingly used instru-
mental variables in our regressions. As instruments for the prosecutorial budget, we
have used the aggregate pay of the full time and part time employees and the total
personal income of the district’s population, both in logs. These instruments are cor-
related with the prosecutorial budget because the prosecutor gets most of his budget
from the local government (a ﬁrst-stage regression has an R2 of .22 and an F-statistic
signiﬁcant at well beyond the .01 level). They are beyond his control, unlike the
prosecutorial budget, which he can request to increase in response to the diﬃculty of
prosecution or conviction.
As instruments for crime we have used the percentage of males between 15 and 24,
20percentage of people who are employed, percentage of males with no schooling, and
housing density, all in logs. A ﬁrst- stage regression has an R2 of .44 and an F-statistic
signiﬁcant at well beyond the .01 level. We did not use the percentage of African-
American population as an instrument of crime because we include it in the main
regression because of its possible eﬀect on the conviction and prosecution rates. Since
African-Americans are disproportionately both victims and perpetrators of crime, we
might well expect a direct eﬀect of race on the prosecutor’s conviction rate (as Butler
[1995] suggests), though its direction would be unclear.
5 Regression Results
Proposition 1 says that in the Social Planner Model an increase in the prosecutor’s
budget increases his prosecution rate for a given crime rate, but Proposition 2 says
that his conviction rate might either rise or fall. Proposition 3 says that in the Political
Model the eﬀect of a budget increase is ambiguous for both the conviction rate and the
prosecution rate. We can test between the two models based on whether prosecutions
rise with budgets. Whether conviction rates rise with budgets is ambiguous in both
models, but we would expect the conviction rate to rise more (or fall less) in districts
where the Political Model seems more likely to apply because prosecutors are elected
rather than appointed or where they are elected with shorter terms.
Table 2 looks at how the conviction rate is related to the prosecutor’s budget, the
number of prosecutions, and other variables. Regression (1) uses tobit. Regression (2)
uses tobit with instrumental variables for both budget and crime as described above,
while Regression (3) instruments only for the prosecutorial budget. Maximization of
the likelihood in regression (2) would not converge, so Stata’s two-step estimator was
used instead. The coeﬃcients from two-step regressions are not comparable to the
standard maximimum likelihood technique, but it is valid for the purpose of testing
the instruments. A Wald chi-squared test applied to regression (2) cannot reject the
exogeneity of budget and crime. We therefore prefer regression (3), in which only the
budget is endogenous, and where a Wald test does reject exogeneity of the budget (at
the 2.1% signiﬁcance level).14 We also tested the residuals from (3) for correlation with
district population and found no signiﬁcant correlation.
In regression (3), the conviction rate does rise with the budget, keeping the number
of prosecutions (the “cases closed” variable) constant. The statistical signiﬁcance is
well above the 5% level. If one calculates the elasticities of how the conviction rate
changes with respect to the budget, (using the STATA mfx command evaluated at the
medians), it is 0.11: a 10% rise in the budget increases the conviction rate by 1.1%.
14A Wald test on a regression which instrumented only for crime (unreported here) could not reject its exogeneity.
21If the conviction rate is at the median of 90%, a rise in the number of prosecutions
by 10% will increase it to 90.90%. That amount may not seem large, but given the
high rate of diminishing returns we would expect in the process of prosecution it is
not surprising. We should note, too, that in regression (1), which assumes that the
prosecutor’s budget does not depend on the desired conviction rate, the budget is not
statistically signiﬁcant as an inﬂuence on the conviction rate.
The conviction rate also falls with the number of prosecutions (the “cases closed”
variable), at a very signiﬁcant level statistically. This is not an implication of the
theory, but one of its assumptions. Yet if one calculates the elasticity of how the
conviction rate changes with respect to prosecutions, it is only −0.031: a 10% rise in
the number of prosecutions reduces the conviction rate by .31%. If the conviction rate
is at the median of 90%, a rise in the number of prosecutions by 10% will reduce it
to about 87.27%. What our statistical signiﬁcance establishes is that the size of the
eﬀect is deﬁnitely small, if nonzero. This implies that in the average United States
district the prosecutor has a large enough stock of potential cases that increasing his
number of prosecutions would scarcely reduce his conviction rate. We conclude from
the budget and number of prosecutions coeﬃcients that the chief limiting factor for
the number of prosecutions is the ﬁxed cost of an additional prosecution.
The chief prosecutor’s salary and years in oﬃce are insigniﬁcant in Table 2. Whether
the chief prosecutor is appointed is highly signiﬁcant, both statistically and in magni-
tude. As the Political Model would predict, appointed prosecutors, less worried about
poorly informed public opinion, have lower conviction rates. The Political Model pre-
dicts that the eﬀect of a longer term of oﬃce would also be negative because it would
ease voter pressure, but it comes in positive and marginally signiﬁcant at the 10%
level. We have no explanation for this.
The other variables in the regression are control variables which do not help dis-
tinguish between the Social Planner Model and the Political Model. The amount of
crime reduces the conviction rate in speciﬁcation (3). The values of the other control
variables are insigniﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero except for the regional dummy South,
which has a positive eﬀect on the conviction rate (at the 5.4% signiﬁcance level). In
particular, the percentage of the population that is black does not signiﬁcantly increase
or reduce the conviction rate.
22Table 2: Explaining the Conviction Rate
(1) (2) (3)
Prosecutorial Budget ($ millions) 0.13 -7.07 27.32**
(0.21) (1.18) (2.31)
Number of Felony Cases Closed (1,000s) -2.72*** -0.71 -.01***
(3.96) (0.45) (2.15)
Chief Prosecutor’s Salary ($10,000s) -0.56** 0.13 -.01
(2.43) (0.30) (1.27)
Chief Prosecutor Appointed (= 1) -4.56 21.39 -114**
(0.71) (0.90) (2.29)
Years in Oﬃce 0.15* 0.18** 0.11
(1.96) (2.09) (0.92)
Term in Oﬃce 1.06 0.79 1.70*
(1.59) (1.09) (1.65)
Number of Index Crimes (1,000s) 0.13 7.39 -23.55**
(0.13) (1.02) (2.11)
Metropolitan Area (=1) -1.26 -2.75 2.75
(0.87) (0.87) (1.14)
African-American Population (%) -0.07 -0.21* 0.35
(1.33) (1.73) (1.52)
Constant 85.37*** 82.95*** 75.59***
(25.81) (23.79) (17.08)
Notes: In parenthesis are z-statistics. *, **, and *** indicate signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5%,
and 1% levels. All regression use tobit with an upper limit of 100 for the conviction rate
and include 3 regional dummies. In regression (1) no explanatory variables are endogenous,
in regression (2) prosecutorial budget and index crime are endogenous, and in regression
(3) only budget is endogenous. Regression (2) uses Stata’s twostep option. Robust standard
errors are used in (1) and (3). See the text for discussion of the instruments and the two-step
option.
Table 3 looks at how the number of prosecutions changes with the budget and other
variables. Since this variable is not bounded as conviction rate is by the upper limit
of 100%, we use simple least squares instead of tobit. As in Table 2, no explanatory
variables are endogenous in the ﬁrst column, both budget and crime are instrumented
23in the second, and budget alone is instrumented in the third. Since these are least
squares regressions rather than tobit, a Hausman speciﬁcation test is appropriate in-
stead of the Wald test. We ﬁnd we cannot reject exogeneity of either or both crime
and budget (the signiﬁcance levels are .45 for budget, .50 for crime, and .50 for both).
We will take column (1) as our preferred regression. Columns (1) and (3), however,
have similar patterns of statistical signiﬁcance, so whether or not we instrument for
the budget makes little diﬀerence.
In Table 3, the prosecutor’s budget does have a highly signiﬁcant eﬀect on the
number of prosecutions, with an elasticity of 25%. This regression holds constant the
population, which naturally also has a positive eﬀect. The amount of crime has an
insigniﬁcant eﬀect, conditioning on budget and population. Districts with more crime
(but the same budget) do not seem to have more prosecutions.
Of the political variables, the chief prosecutor’s salary and whether he is appointed
have no eﬀect on the number of prosecutions, but the longer he is in oﬃce, the fewer the
prosecutions, an elasticity of 6.7% that is mrginally signiﬁcant. Thus, this regression
lends mild support to the Political Model.
Of the control variables, being more Republican or in a metropolitan area has
no signiﬁcant eﬀect. The South and West prosecute more than the Northeast and
Midwest. The percentage African American has a highly signiﬁcant positive eﬀect.
Conviction rates do rise with prosecution budgets and are higher where prosecutors
are elected rather than appointed and where terms of oﬃce are shorter. The number
of prosecutions also rises with the budget, but falls with the prosecutor’s tenure in
oﬃce. Overall, this lends mild support to the Political Model over the Social Planner
Model. As predicted by both of the models, the conviction rate falls with the number
of prosecutions, but it falls very slightly.
24Table 3: Explaining the Number of Prosecutions
(1) (2) (3)
Prosecutorial Budget (millions) 179.15** -82.36 390.33*
(2.55) (0.35) (1.70)
Chief Prosecutor’s Salary ($10,000’s) -7.86 5.70 -10.77
(0.76) (0.27) (0.96)
Chief Prosecutor Appointed (=1) -570.46 439.21 -1263.96
(1.25) (0.39) (1.34)
Years in Oﬃce -4.29* -4.58 -4.88*
(1.74) (1.62) (1.74)
Term of Oﬃce 27.13 3.68 39.61
(0.83) (0.08) (1.24)
Population (1000’s) 5.59*** 5 3.72**
( 4.02) (1.33) (2.16)
Number of Index Crimes (1,000’s) 69.47 548.75 -41.63
(0.46) (0.77) (0.23)
African-American Population (%) 18.75*** 14.20** 20.74***
(5.41) (2.42) (4.91)
Vote for Bush in 2000 (%) 2.65 0.34 4.18
(1.18) (0.09) (1.28)
Metropolitan Area (=1) -68.39 -78.22 -35.65
(0.89) (0.92) (0.49)
Constant -192.92 10.9 -336.72
( 1.05) (0.03) (1.33)
Notes: In parenthesis are z-statistics. *, **, and *** indicate signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5%, and
1% levels. All regression use least squares and include 3 regional dummies, not reported.
In regression (1) no explanatory variables are endogenous, in regression (2) prosecutorial
budget and index crime are endogenous, and in regression (3) only budget is endogenous.
Robust standard errors are used. See the text for discussion of the instruments.
The theoretical model established that the conviction rate might actually fall with
the prosecutor’s budget because the larger budget causes him to pursue more diﬃcult
cases. The conviction rate regressions in Table 2 would not detect this, because they
condition on the number of cases prosecuted. If instead we simply look at the corre-
lation between the conviction rate and the prosecutor’s budget per capita, it is -.029,
which is indeed negative, but tiny. Another approach is to see how the conviction rate
25depends on the budget when we condition on all of our explanatory variables except
for budget. This can be done by repeating regression (3) of Table 2 but omitting
cases prosecuted as an explanatory variable. The result is that the budget comes in in
positive and signiﬁcant, as before. That makes sense, since the eﬀect of the number
of prosecutions we found in regression (3) was tiny, an elasticity of -3.1%, so that if
the elasticity of prosecutions with respect to budget is the 25% we found in Table
3’s regression (3), the negative indirect eﬀect of more prosecutions is still less than
the positive direct eﬀect of the budget on the conviction rate. Thus, the theoretical
possibility of the conviction rate falling with an increase in the prosecutor’s budget is
not an empirical actuality in our U.S. data.
Conclusions
A prosecutor’s high conviction rate may not be a sign that he is tough on crime
and doing a good job. Instead, he might just be taking easy cases and letting too many
criminals go without prosecuting them. We have explored the implications of this idea
for a theory of prosecutors and used it to think about prosecutions in Japan and the
United States. Prosecutors have a choice between using extra resources to prosecute
their current level of cases harder, the intensive margin, or to increase the prosecution
rate, the extensive margin. A social planner would want both margins increased if the
budget expands. Prosecutors are agents of the voters, however, which means they are
subject to the temptation of agency slack and that they are monitored using imperfect
summary statistics such as the conviction rate. As a result, we do not necessarily see
increases in the budget spent on increasing the conviction rate, or even on increasing
the prosecution rate. This may be particularly true for prosecutors who are elected,
as in most of the United States, but appointed. Japanese prosecutors seem, with
their low budget compared to American prosecutors, to have low prosecution rates
and high conviction rates. We do ﬁnd that higher budgets are associated with both
higher amounts of prosecution and higher conviction rates conditioning on the amount
of prosecution. We also ﬁnd that appointed prosecutors in the United States do have
lower conviction rates than elected ones and that those with longer tenure in oﬃce
prosecute fewer cases.
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